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Introduction 
“This thing was huge … It was extensive, and it was interconnected. It 
was the most sophisticated radio network we’d ever encountered.”1 
 
In the latter half of 2006, La Compañía–a Mexican drug smuggling 
cooperative consisting of the Gulf Cartel and their former 
paramilitary/security wing, Los Zetas–began in earnest an effort to construct 
a large scale radio communication network throughout the gulf coast states 
of Mexico.  The group’s goal was to establish a proprietary, real-time 
communications infrastructure throughout their areas of operations for the 
purposes of operational coordination and intelligence gathering, a goal which 
was accomplished under the direction of radio specialist Jose Luis Del Toro 
Estrada (aka El Técnico).  Estrada, an agent of La Compañía who owned and 
operated a seemingly innocent radio equipment shop in McAllen, Texas, 
along with other specialists in his employ, carried out the research, planning, 
and much of the physical implementation of the initial system.  By the time 
he was arrested in 2008, Estrada had facilitated La Compañía’s 
implementation of specialized radio hardware in both urban and rural 
environments across much of northeastern Mexico and had also seen to the 
integration of the computer systems and software necessary to securely 
utilize the network to great effect. 2  After Estrada’s arrest, the operation and 
expansion of the radio network continued under the control of La Compañía, 
and then solely under the control of Los Zetas, following their split from the 
Gulf Cartel in 2010.3  Prior to Mexican military efforts to dismantle various 
local hubs of the radio network in 2011, the system as a whole was believed to 
make use of many hundreds of antennas and signal repeaters, which, under 
the control of a series of command centers, offered service in vital areas of 
operation stretching from core Loz Zetas territories in Nuevo León and 
Tamaulipas, into central Mexico and through the gulf states as far south as 
the border with Guatemala. 4 
                                                        
1 Damon Tabor, “Radio Tecnico: How the Zetas Cartel Took Over Mexico with Walkie-
Talkies,” Popular Science, March 25, 2014, available at: 
http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/radio-tecnico-how-zetas-cartel-took-over-
mexico-walkie-talkies. 
2 Brian Anderson, “Cartel Radio: Drugs and Kidnappings and Blood on the Air,” 
Motherboard, December 27, 2011, available at: 
http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/cartel-radio. 
3 Tabor, “Radio Tecnico.” 
4 Ibid.; “Narcos tienen sofisticados de comunicación,” Elsalvador.com, December 29, 
2011, available at: 
http://www.elsalvador.com/mwedh/nota/nota_completa.asp?idCat=47860&idArt=65
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Decision 
Within La Compañía, Los Zetas was the force responsible for initiating the 
radio network project and were the entity that made decisions about the radio 
network throughout its construction and operation. 5  Los Zetas’ interest in 
taking on this task was likely born from a desire to maximize their control 
over activities of interest —illicit and legitimate—in their areas of operation 
and to do this more nimbly in the face of both governmental and criminal 
adversaries. Holding territory and being able to monitor what went on there 
more fluidly stood to enhance not only Los Zetas’ ability to engage in their 
own lucrative drug trafficking operations, 6 but also their ability to tax other 
trafficking groups for passage7 and to effectively run their various other 
smuggling, extortion, kidnapping, racketeering and bootlegging operations.8 
As a more multidimensional group than typical cartels, Los Zetas’ chief 
motivation in constructing an extensive radio network can be said to have 
been to possess the logistical and tactical advantages that would facilitate the 
emphatic employment of violence that underpinned the group’s diversified 
criminal portfolio.  Having its own tailor-made network allowed Los Zetas 
operatives on the ground to be deployed with a deftness and speed that 
enabled not only the maintenance, but also the expansion, of the group’s 
various revenue generating enterprises. Additionally, “the network allowed 
Los Zetas operatives to conduct encrypted conversations without depending 
on the official cellphone network, which is relatively easy for authorities to tap 
into, and in many cases does not reach into the Mexican countryside.”9  The 
                                                        
11680 
5 Lisa Campbell, “Los Zetas: Operational Assessment,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 21:1 
(2010): 58-59. 
6 Max Manwaring, “A New Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment: 
The Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies,” Strategic Studies Institute, September, 
2009: 22, available at: 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub940.pdf.  
“The Zetas’ first priority is to operate a successful business enterprise, with more than 
adequate self-protection and self-promotion. This private military organization 
encourages diversification of activities, diffusion of risk, and the flexibility to make quick 
adjustments, correct mistakes, and exploit developing opportunities.” 
7 Samuel Logan, “A Profile of Los Zetas: Mexico’s Second Most Powerful Drug Cartel,” 
Combating Terrorism Center, February 16, 2012, available at: 
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-profile-of-los-zetas-mexicos-second-most-powerful-
drug-cartel 
8 Scott Stewart, “Mexican Cartels: Los Zetas,” Stratfor, March 4, 2014, available at: 
https://www.stratfor.com/video/mexican-cartels-los-zetas 
9 Michael Weissenstein, “Mexico’s cartels build own national radio system,” Associated 
Press, December 27, 2011, available at: http://news.yahoo.com/mexicos-cartels-build-
own-national-radio-system-200251816.html; and Author “Mexico Security Memo: Zetas 
Communications Network Dismantled,” Stratfor Global Intelligence, September 13, 2011, 
available at: https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico-security-memo-zetas-
communications-network-dismantled. 
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military background of the group’s leadership surely also played a unique part 
in spurring on the creation of the network.  Retired colonel Bob Killebrew said 
the following about Los Zetas:  
 
“[T]hey have a paramilitary mindset...a chain of command, an 
appreciation of what technology can do to enhance paramilitary 
capabilities.  If you’re a military guy who started such a group, one of 
your first concerns is communications.  You can build communication 
networks at a relatively low expense if you have the expertise.  So, it’s 
quite possible to build, say, a network for a low-level handheld radio 
carried by a taxi driver that can be picked up, re-transmitted, boosted 
up, and sent anywhere you want to send it, and even encrypted after 
it’s transmitted.”10 
 
Taking into account its persistence in maintaining and expanding the 
network, it is clear that Los Zetas considered the advantages of the system to 
have been of great value, well worth the estimated tens of millions of dollars 
spent on it.11  At the height of the radio network, were estimated by the 
Department of Justice to have been worth in total between 18 and 39 billion 
dollars annually.12  Compared to the scale of the Los Zetas operation as a 
whole, some have pointed out that the network was, “relatively speaking, 
cheap” and that it might have “paid for itself with the delivery of one large 
cocaine shipment into the U.S.”13  This is not to forget that Los Zetas also 
profited in no small way from their endeavors in piracy, extortion, and other 
illicit enterprises.  One group of Los Zetas is alleged to have stolen $46 
million worth of oil from Pemex (the Mexican state owned oil concern) over 
the course of the two years before its members were arrested in April 2009.14 
All indications are that the radio network was not a nominal expense, but was 
comfortably within the financial means of Los Zetas and regarded by the 
leadership to be of considerable value to the organization’s field operations.  
Though the intelligence and tactical benefits of the radio network surely had 
strategic implications for Los Zetas as well, there is no evidence that the 
                                                        
10 Sam Clements, “Los Zetas Drug Cartel Has Their Own Radio Network,” VICE, January 
2, 2013, available at: http://www.vice.com/read/the-los-zetas-drug-cartel-have-their-
own-radio-network. 
11 Tabor, “Radio Tecnico.” 
12 Patrick Radden Keefe, “Cocaine Incorporated,” The New York Times, June 15, 2012, 
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/magazine/how-a-mexican-drug-
cartel-makes-its-billions.html. 
13 Tabor, “Radio Tecnico.” 
14 Jesse Bogan, “Mexican Drug Gangs Diversify Into Oil,” Forbes, August 8, 2009, 
available at: http://www.forbes.com/2009/08/11/mexico-oil-theft-business-energy-
drugs.html. 
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network was ever used to convey strategic level communications (i.e. 
communications involving the organizational leaders).  Instead “contacts 
among the highest-ranking Los Zetas operatives tended to take place in highly 
encrypted communications over the internet.”15 
 
In 2006, when the effort to construct the radio network was initiated, 
strategic decision making for La Compañía was handled by a trio of top 
bosses: Antonio Ezequiel Cardenas-Guillen, Jorge Eduardo Costilla-Sanchez, 
and Heriberto Lazcano-Lazcano. 16  However, a 2010 analysis of Los Zetas’ 
organizational structure indicated that ‘communications experts,’ even while 
Los Zetas was in league with the Gulf Cartel, reported directly and solely to 
Lazcano-Lazcano (a.k.a. Z-3) and ‘Los Zetas principal leadership.’17  This 
strongly suggests that Heriberto Lazcano-Lazcano, leader of Los Zetas from 
late 2004 until his death in October 2012, would have been the person with 
the single most influence over decisions regarding the network’s creation and 
expansion.  Some ambiguity is introduced, however, by the fact that Lazcano-
Lazcano did, for a time, “[go] underground, successfully hiding and 
apparently ‘off the grid’.”18  The major decisions regarding the radio network 
were likely made between a few La Compañía top leaders in the early phases, 
before shifting more singularly toward Lazcano-Lazcano as time went on and 
Los Zetas became a standalone organization.  There is no evidence of dissent 
or debate in the process of deciding to build the network, as might be 
expected due to the more than adequate resources of the organization and the 
obvious utility the radio network would have had within the Zetas operational 
philosophy.  One account suggests that Estrada oversaw the creation of a local 
radio network for Los Zetas in the Mexican border town of Matamoros as 
early as 2004;19 it is possible that this project served as proof of concept 
before the larger subsequent effort was undertaken. 
                                                        
15 Weissenstein, “Mexico’s cartels build own national radio system.”  
16 United States v. Del Toro Estrada: Plea Agreement, United States District Court 
Southern District of Texas Houston Division, (2009): 1, 8-9, available at: 
http://docslide.us/documents/jose-luis-del-toro-estrada-plea-agreement.html. 
17 Campbell, “Los Zetas: Operational Assessment.” 
18 Gary J. Hale, “Mexico's Government Begins to Retake Northeastern Mexico,” James A 
Baker III Institute for Public Policy, December 9, 2011: 7, available at: 
http://bakerinstitute.org/research/mexicos-government-begins-to-retake-
northeastern-mexico/. 
19 Tabor, “Radio Tecnico.” 
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Figure 1: Los Zetas Intelligence Hierarchy20 
 
Court documents from Estrada’s 2008 indictment lend some insight into how 
decisions were made and orders given once the effort to construct the network 
was underway.  Confessional accounts indicate that once Estrada and his 
technical team had conferred with the principal Zetas leadership as to what 
was needed to establish the network in given areas of Zeta operation, the 
principal leadership would send orders to local “plaza” bosses, leaving it up to 
them to find ways to acquire the necessary equipment and implement the 
network in their area of responsibility—likely with assistance from some 
                                                        
20 Lisa J. Campbell, “Los Zetas: operational assessment,” in Robert J. Bunker 
(ed.), Narcos Over the Border (London, UK: Routledge, 2011), 59. 
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contingent of Estrada’s technical team.21  These plaza bosses who oversaw 
specific drug trafficking corridors were reportedly not only responsible for 
purchasing everything from antenna towers to handheld radios for their local 
portion of the network, but were also expected to replace whatever parts of 
the local radio infrastructure might be destroyed by security forces.22 
 
From the outset of building the radio network, through the years of its 
operation and expansion, Los Zetas has certainly had a very high tolerance for 
risk.  Given the risk inherent to all of the group’s activities, the size and 
survivability of the group, its efficiency and its vast capital resources, there is 
no reason to believe that the effort to build and operate the radio network 
involved much in the way of self-imposed limitations or instances of the 
group stopping short of its goal because of concerns about the operation or 
personnel.  
 
Given the scale of the operation, its persistence, the benefits it afforded, and 
its relative inexpensiveness, there is no reason to believe that any physical or 
temporal limits were ever conceived of for the network.  Rather, the intention 
of Los Zetas was probably to keep pushing the size and capability of the 
network as long as those expansions continued to enhance the organization’s 
ability to conduct lucrative operations.  According to Bob Killebrew: 
 
“If the taxi driver is calling up to warn someone about the Mexican 
army leaving town, he only needs to tell the people in his immediate 
geographical area.  So they build a network that will go that far—call it 
the local network.  But there can be a second network—a state 
network, say—and there can be a national network as well.  As long as 
they’ve got the terrain to put the repeaters (signal boosters) down and 
they’ve got the access to the materials and the technicians to do it, 
there’s nothing to stop them from going global, as I’m sure they 
already are.”23 
 
Implementation 
Expertise, unlike the infrastructure itself, was one aspect of the operation that 
was not always thought of as being open ended.  When the Los Zetas needed 
                                                        
21 “United States v. Del Toro Estrada” (2009) “Wire calls show that each Company plaza 
boss was required to purchase tower, repeaters, and radios in the system and to share the 
cost.” 
22 Spencer Ackerman, “Radio Zeta: How Mexico’s Drug Cartels Stay Networked,” Wired, 
December 27, 2011, available at: http://www.wired.com/2011/12/cartel-radio-mexico/. 
23 Clements, “Los Zetas Drug Cartel Has Their Own Radio Network.”  
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technical expertise, the group either bought it or took it by force.  In later 
phases, Los Zetas resorted to kidnapping technical experts and treating these 
experts as disposable assets.24  
 
The individuals most instrumental in the initial implementation and 
expansion of Los Zetas’ radio network were Jose Luis Del Toro Estrada (aka 
El Técnico) and his technical team.  “His team included an expert who 
specialized in installing radio towers and antennas, and another who 
researched new technology,”25 along with a number of others who are 
believed to have had similarly specialized responsibilities.26  Exactly how 
Estrada came to be affiliated with Los Zetas and La Compañía is not known, 
nor is it known how he recruited his team or how he came to possess the 
technical acumen necessary to oversee the creation of the network. 27  It is all 
but sure that the promise of considerable monetary compensation played a 
significant part in both Estrada and his team members coming to work on the 
network.  Estrada’s team was estimated to include about twenty individuals,28 
but it is not known if any evaded apprehension and continued to work for Los 
Zetas after Estrada’s arrest. 
  
Following Operation Reckoning, the mass DEA crackdown that caught 
Estrada, Los Zetas’ in-house communications expertise was severely 
undermined, if not destroyed completely.  It seems that it was this 
development that spurred Los Zetas to shift tactics.  Although there are 
reports of cartels recruiting students from technical schools and creating front 
                                                        
24 “Techies Forced into Slave Labour,” The Times of India, November 12, 2012, posted by 
Nick Carraway and available at: 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/chat/2961036/posts. 
25 Dane Schiller and Susan Carroll, “Former Gulf Cartel Insider Spills His High-tech 
Secrets.” The Houston Chronicle, August 25, 2009, available at: 
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Former-Gulf-Cartel-insider-spills-
his-high-tech-1725590.php. 
26 “United States v. Del Toro Estrada,” (2009) “Estrada employed various 
communications specialists to assist him in running and maintaining the system. Two of 
those specialists are Omar Alejandro Macias Rodriguez and Marko Gutierrez. Rodriguez 
installs towers and antennas as well as programs and maintains repeaters and the radios. 
Zuniga researches new technology, installs towers, as well as programs and maintains 
repeaters and the radios. Zuniga also installs the hidden cameras used by the Company.” 
27 Tabor “Radio Tecnico.” “Many details about Del Toro Estrada’s involvement with The 
Company remain opaque. It’s unclear whether he was recruited in McAllen or placed 
there as an operative. Also unclear is whether he was a formally trained engineer or some 
kind of criminal autodidact who spent years steeping himself in the finer points of radio 
broadcast engineering. Either way, he did not match the profile of a typical cartel 
member. ‘He wasn’t an assassin. He was a geek, a technician,’ says a former federal 
counter-narcotics official who now runs an intelligence consulting firm in Arlington, 
Virginia.” 
28 Campbell, “Los Zetas: operational assessment.”  
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companies to pay them,29 Los Zetas—after Estrada’s arrest—preferred the 
disposable approach, kidnapping engineers and forcing them into slave labor 
for as long as they were useful.30  In these kidnappings, Los Zetas tended to 
pursue engineers and technicians in Zeta-controlled territory who had 
experience installing telecommunications equipment.  In one known case, 
and probably in others, Los Zetas had ties to its victim’s employer and 
coworkers.31  At least thirty-six telecommunications professionals who went 
missing between 2009 and 2012 are thought to have been taken by Los 
Zetas.32  At this time, no reports have been found of any captured technicians 
being returned, a sad indication that they were not spared Los Zetas’ brutal 
pragmatism and were likely killed at the point that they were no longer useful, 
in order to maintain operational security.  There were no known instances of 
anything that would qualify as collaboration with other non-state entities in 
the process of creating the radio network, unless one were to consider Los 
Zetas and the Gulf Cartel to be collaborators during the period that they were 
technically operating as the single organization. 
 
Little is known about how the equipment used to construct the network was 
acquired or how Los Zetas members went about putting it into place, though 
it is hard to imagine, in an organization so steeped in violence, that safety was 
ever a pronounced concern.  In terms of operational security (OPSEC), Los 
Zetas is known to employ various forms of OPSEC tradecraft in keeping with 
its military origins.  It is probable that the kind of OPSEC the group would 
practice by default was sufficient for most communications network-oriented 
operations.33  With concern for the security of the system’s equipment after 
implementation, Los Zetas operatives are known to have painted many of 
their rural antennas to camouflage them among the surrounding brush and to 
have generally placed antennas and signal repeaters in remote, difficult to 
reach areas.34  Furthermore, as the network came online, it may have 
contributed to the operational security of its own expansion and maintenance, 
                                                        
29 Doris Gómora, “Plagia narco a técnicos en comunicación,” El Universal, December 13, 
2011, available at: http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/primera/38356.html. 
30 “Techies Forced into Slave Labour.” The Times of India.  
31 Paris Martinez, “How Mexico's Zetas Enslave Engineers,” InSight Crime, October 25, 
2012, available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/categories/zetas-enslave-engineers-in-
mexico. 
32 “Narcos mexicanos esclavizan a ingenieros para usarlos en sus proyectos,” RT, 
November 2, 2012, available at: https://actualidad.rt.com/sociedad/view/57585-
narcos-mexicanos-esclavizan-ingenieros-usarlos-proyectos. 
33 Campbell, “Los Zetas: Operational Assessment,” 72-73. “The Zetas also employ 
counterintelligence cells that monitor law enforcement activity and rival cartel 
operations. Information gathered via surveillance activities is used by the Zetas to plan 
their own timing of operations and routes for smuggling attempts.” 
34 Anderson, “Cartel Radio: Drugs and Kidnappings and Blood on the Air.”  
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as it allowed for more secure communication and communication in certain 
remote areas that were otherwise “off the grid.”35  Conversely, there are also 
accounts of cases where the operational security of the network seems to have 
been intentionally compromised to send a message to authorities.  For 
example, the network was used at times to issue threats across Mexican 
military frequencies and, in one case, “Del Toro Estrada installed a repeater 
on the roof of a Mexican police station, either as a brazen display of the 
cartel’s impunity or as a signal of the department’s corruption.”36 
 
The effort to build the network began in earnest in 2006, with Estrada in 
place, leading the effort for Los Zetas and La Compañía.  It is not known 
exactly where the effort began or at what rate it proceeded, but it is likely that 
the first pieces of the network were implemented in Nuevo Laredo, the area 
seen as the hometown of Los Zetas and a place where it operated with near 
total impunity.  Early implementation in areas tightly controlled by Los Zetas 
may be the closest thing the construction of the network had to a trial run.  In 
Nuevo Laredo, antennas were said to “sprout from rooftops and empty lots” 
and to be “swiftly replaced” if ever dismantled.37  
 
As the network expanded, the effort took different forms in urban and rural 
areas.  In urban areas, the first thing Estrada and his team would have done 
was to identify unused frequencies to avoid interference from the likes of taxi 
and truck drivers’ radio chatter. 38  With the local spectrum of frequencies 
mapped, implementation of the network’s physical components could begin.  
In urban areas equipment was typically installed on the tops of existing 
structures, in some cases even piggybacking on the capacity of existing radio 
equipment.  It was allegedly not uncommon for Estrada to make use of 
existing radio towers and to “[hijack] radio repeaters—devices that receive 
and boost radio signals—from companies like Nextel and [reprogram] the 
equipment to use the cartel’s preselected, low-volume frequencies.” 39 
 
In isolated rural areas, the network was designed to relay radio signals over 
long distances.  Los Zetas agents would often erect towers and take advantage 
of local topography to ensure that antennas and repeaters were best situated 
to send signals long distances over trees and mountains.  To accomplish this 
Los Zetas would erect towers on the highest ground it could access and affix 
                                                        
35 Weissenstein, “Mexico’s cartels build own national radio system.”  
36 Tabor, “Radio Tecnico.” 
37 Weissenstein, “Mexico’s cartels build own national radio system.” 
38 Tabor, “Radio Tecnico.”  
39 Ibid. 
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antennas and signal repeaters atop these towers.  In one case Los Zetas 
operatives are known to have gone as far as to install one of these towers at 
the summit of a volcano.40 
 
“In Veracruz, a string of about a dozen tower installations provided a 
100-mile radius of communications capability—meaning the Zetas 
could track anything that moved, whether encroaching Sinaloa cartel 
gunmen or military convoys, in at least 10 towns and cities.”41 
  
“This was a rural based system meant to be hard to detect 
(camouflaged) and self-contained, relying upon solar panel cells to cut 
down on battery/power maintenance requirements.”42  
 
As the network got to be very large and complex, Los Zetas also maintained 
sophisticated command and control centers where it established computer 
systems to manage the radio communications on the network.  One such 
central hub, after being raided, was found to house sophisticated computer 
systems for managing the network and specialized radio equipment used for 
ground to air radio communication.43  This particular hub, located in the 
urban area of Torreón and known to Los Zetas as “The Central,” was 
estimated to have contained $350,000 worth of equipment.  Its purpose was 
to provide regional command and control as well as counter-intelligence, 
primarily in the form of military communications scanning.44  
 
“As of late 2011, the computer systems that controlled the network 
were sophisticated enough to allow the cartel to direct specific 
communications to specific radios, bypassing others.”45 
 
The precise rate at which the network was constructed is not known.  
However, “[by] 2008, Del Toro Estrada’s infrastructure was operational in 
most states in Mexico (and likely in the U.S. borderlands as well).”46  By 2011, 
                                                        
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Robert J. Bunker, “Mexican Cartel Operational Note No. 1,” Small Wars Journal, 
December 17, 2011, available at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mexican-cartel-
operational-note-no-1. 
43 “Zetas’s High Tech Narco-Communications Central Seized (VIDEO),” Hispanically 
Speaking News, November 21, 2011, available at: 
http://www.hispanicallyspeakingnews.com/latino-daily-news/details/zetass-high-
tech-narco-communications-central-seized-video/11910/. 
44 Bunker, “Mexican Cartel Operational Note No. 1.”  
45 Weissenstein, “Mexico’s cartels build own national radio system.” 
46 Tabor, “Radio Tecnico.”  
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the network had grown even larger and more sophisticated.  The best 
indication of its scope and complexity can be gleaned from the accounts of 
what was uncovered in the Mexican military’s late 2011 crackdown.  For 
example, an operation conducted by the Mexican marines in September of 
2011 across Veracruz State reported the seizure of thirteen large antennae, 
seven signal amplifiers, seven truck trailers used as base stations, and a 
variety of other radio and computer equipment. 47  Some three months later, 
on December 4, the Mexican Army announced the total findings of operations 
in the states of Veracruz, Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, San Luis Potosi and 
Tamaulipas.  This announcement revealed that they had uncovered at least 
167 large antennas, 155 signal repeaters, 166 power sources, 71 components of 
computerized systems and 1,446 radios.48  
 
Considering that the figures above represent only the fraction of the network 
that was discovered in a handful of raids in late 2011, it is left to the 
imagination to fathom the extent of what Los Zetas created and to wonder 
about how it was able to accomplish this feat.  The questions of how the group 
was able to secure the necessary materials, expertise, and labor, all appear to 
have the same simple answer: spending power.  Beyond these basic resource 
hurdles, it appears to have been the logistics of implementing the network, 
ensuring security of communications, and being able to transmit over the 
Mexican landscape emerged as the most prominent obstacles.  The issue of 
communications security was resolved continually as the network became 
more sophisticated and was being managed from computerized control 
centers, from which frequencies could be managed and encryption measures 
introduced.  The terrain issues in the backcountry were remedied by very 
determined—and certainly well-funded—efforts, as Los Zetas operatives 
installed towers, antennas, and signal amplifying repeaters on the highest 
terrain.  In urban settings, the solution was plain audacity, as existing 
infrastructure was hijacked in facilitation of the network’s function.  The final 
obstacle of note faced by Los Zetas in the creation and operation of the 
network was the Mexican authorities’ continual efforts to dismantle it.  In the 
group’s heyday it seemed content to continually replace whatever the police 
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took down.  However, after the death of Los Zetas leader Heriberto Lazcano-
Lazcano, the group seemed to have lost some cohesion and operational 
momentum.49  This state of affairs, wherein Los Zetas leaders fell in relatively 
quick succession, may have rendered the group unable to maintain the 
network’s operation with the same ease exhibited in the period from the 
project’s initiation in 2006 until Lazcano-Lazcano’s death in late 2012, 
ultimately leading to the network’s decline. 
 
Analysis 
Los Zetas’ decision to construct a large radio network was primarily driven by 
its desire for a communications system that would enhance their operations, 
but which was also more secure than commercial systems and which could be 
made to service its more remote areas of operation.  A secondary motivation 
for creating the network was the message it would send to adversaries.  The 
network, once implemented, projected power and prestige by way of the 
operational advantage it gave Los Zetas over other cartels, as well as via the 
blatant affront it was to the state security forces tasked with keeping it in 
check.   
 
However, these motivators alone do not account for how readily Los Zetas 
embraced this technology relative to other, equally wealthy cartels.  What set 
Los Zetas ahead of the curve in this respect was the military background of its 
original and most influential members.  At the time that the initial decisions 
were made to pursue this technology, the most influential members were 
veterans of Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas Especiales (GAFE), Mexico’s elite 
counter-narcotics airborne special forces, and of Kaibiles, Guatemalan Special 
Forces. These leaders in the emergent years were also careful to ensure that 
the martial characteristics and practices of the group would remain central, 
leading them to recruit heavily from the more than 100,000 men who 
deserted the Mexican army between 2000 and 2009 and to restrict elevated 
roles in the group to those with military backgrounds.50 The men making 
decisions for the group then were certainly attracted to methods and tools 
that would complement their paramilitary mode of operation, something the 
radio network certainly did.  Even before the network was in place, Los Zetas 
was operationally well suited, as far as non-state organizations go, to 
incorporate and take advantage of proprietary radio communication.  More so 
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than any analogous group, Los Zetas in its prime seemed to have prided itself 
on efficiency and precision.  The premium it put on these qualities and the 
military-like means by which it embodied them made the construction of a 
robust radio communication network an option with glaringly obvious appeal 
to Los Zetas leadership, once presented. 
 
Operation of Los Zetas’ radio network may be ongoing, though almost 
certainly in a greatly reduced capacity since its heyday and particularly since 
Alejandro "Omar" Treviño Morales “Z-42,” the last undisputed successor to 
the group’s top position, was arrested in early March 2015.51  No matter the 
current state or the eventual fate of the network, this particular innovative 
enterprise is not the kind of complex engineering task that necessarily had a 
point of culminating success or failure.  Ultimately, the Zetas’ radio network 
can be viewed as a general, if not ongoing, success in that it is thought to have 
markedly enhanced Los Zetas’ ability to operate as a complex criminal 
organization.  This determination is evidenced by the fact that the initial tests 
of the system prompted such dramatic expansion and that this expansion was 
continued to the point that the network offered Los Zetas at least some 
encrypted radio communication capability in locales stretching from the U.S. 
border to Guatemala, and across the majority of Mexico’s 31 states. 52 
 
The factors that led the group to such success in this engineering endeavor 
were organizational and twofold.  First, the vast reserves of money the group 
had at its disposal plainly afforded it the ability to act ambitiously and 
prospectively without risking ruin, should any number of attempts fail.  The 
second major factor contributing to the success of the radio network was Los 
Zetas’ ruthless efficiency and esprit de corps.  In the period that the network 
was erected, Los Zetas operated with a unique military discipline and 
cohesion that was also unimpeded by moral considerations.  This allowed its 
members to employ violence to great effect in clearing the obstacles to any 
given end, and then conduct whatever business that violence facilitated with 
similar directness.  This ability, coupled with very deep coffers, enabled Los 
Zetas to build a highly complex, nearly-national radio network at an 
astounding pace and with very few serious impediments.  Given the lack of 
detail in open sources, it remains difficult to analyze the level of innovation 
that the project entailed.  A certain degree is unquestionably on display in 
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features of the network like purpose-built solar panel and battery riggings to 
run remote signal repeating systems and the various methods of concealment 
and subterfuge employed to allow for such an extensive system to operate for 
years in the face of government counter operations.  
 
That said, the forces that combined to drive the project to success seem to 
have simply plowed through many of the obstacles such a complex project 
might be expected to face before any great innovation was needed to 
circumvent them.  While the network may never have gotten off the ground 
without the clever work of the initial consenting contingent of technical 
experts, the later stages of the network’s operation stand as a striking 
demonstration of how effectively a subnational organization can accomplish a 
complex engineering task through a combination of cash and ruthlessness.  
Although the Los Zetas’ power has waned after the loss of several successive 
leaders and the progressive loss of group cohesion and paramilitary character 
has left the status of the radio network, even in Los Zetas’ core northeast 
Mexican territory, very much in question, some analysts have pointed out that 
other cartels are currently undergoing “zetanization” as they attempt to 
emulate some of the operational capacities enjoyed by Los Zetas at its 
operational peak.53  With the Los Zetas having already demonstrated how 
such a communications network can be built, it may not be long before 
another cartel or some other type of sophisticated criminal group, not only 
replicates, but expands upon the concept. 
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